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October 6, 2005: NORTON AT KATRINA HEARING SAYS FEMA LACKS TALENT AND CAPABILITY TO DO ITS JOB

January 9, 2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 6, 2005

NORTON AT KATRINA HEARING SAYS FEMA LACKS TALENT AND CAPABILITY TO DO ITS JOB

Washington, DC—At a hearing today on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) response to Hurricane Katrina, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) questioned whether FEMA has the “management talent” in the short-term or for the “long haul” that the Katrina recovery necessitates. She said, “FEMA has apparently regressed to its state before James Lee Witt, the first career disaster specialist to head FEMA in 1993, reorganized and energized the agency.” Norton is Ranking Member of the Transportation Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management which has oversight of FEMA.

She said that the District of Columbia was among the first local jurisdictions to reach out to Katrina victims to provide shelter and a full bevy of services. But like the District, many of the states and local governments have laid out millions of dollars upfront and hope that they will not be left still waiting for payment years from now.

In her opening statement, Norton said that it is clear that FEMA has suffered rather than benefited from its absorption into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Norton, who is also a member of the Homeland Security Committee, supported placing FEMA in DHS, but she said she is cosponsor of a bill to make FEMA a stand alone agency. The Katrina response was so disastrous and so much of FEMA funding has been directed to terrorism, the Congresswoman said.

Norton said greater congressional oversight is necessary to “return FEMA to the halcyon days of praiseworthiness,” and to enable it to once again become the professional quick recovery agency it became in the 1990s.

The full text of Norton’s statement follows.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman for calling this first hearing in a series to examine the recovery process in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. I fully agree with your purpose today to move from assigning blame, acknowledging there were failures at every level of government, but instead to concentrate on our responsibility to focus on FEMA, which reports to this subcommittee, with the goal of ensuring that the ongoing response of FEMA is efficient, effective and responsive to the needs of the people of the Gulf Region and other regions of the country. Under your predecessor as chair, this subcommittee had five FEMA hearings or markups after the FEMA Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred all of the statutory functions of the Stafford Act from the Director of FEMA to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), further delegated to the Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R). Although I am a member of the Homeland Security Committee who was a strong advocate of the creation of the Department, I have reluctantly become an original co-sponsor of a bill to remove FEMA from DHS to help enable it to once again become the professional, quick recovery agency it became in the 1990s.

At our September 24, 2003 markup, I cautioned about challenges to hazard mitigation or prevention activities that were clear then. States and local officials were complaining that the increased emphasis on terrorism had kept them so busy trying to keep up with security alerts, overtime costs, and the myriad of terrorism-related grant programs that hazard mitigation which we now know might have led to a better response to Katrina was in steep decline. Yet the Administration in its FY 2003 budget request had proposed the elimination of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and the FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriation Bill, over the objections of our committee and various stakeholders, reduced the mandated percentage of HMGP funds from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. The reduction so inhibited the ability of the state and local governments to effectively carry out preparations for hazards and so dramatically increased the cost of natural disasters that we restored funding levels back to 15 percent at our markup.

In May 2004, we were very concerned that the President’s FY 2005 budget proposal reduced funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant program (EMPG), even though Congress had strongly supported state and local personnel planning when it included specific language in the FY 2004 DHS appropriations bill stating, “EMPG is the backbone of the nation’s emergency management system…Now more than ever, the planning activities carried out in this program are of the utmost importance…”

The result of short sighted shift of funding from FEMA is clear in the aftermath of Katrina. Presently, almost one million people in the Gulf Region have registered with FEMA for individual assistance, but only 72 full time employees are in the Recovery Division. This division is responsible for reviewing the paperwork which is the basis for reimbursement by FEMA for eligible activities, including debris removal, housing assistance and reconstructing public buildings and infrastructure. Although FEMA has a vast network of disaster assistance and other reserve employees it can call upon, the agency internally clearly lacks the management talent to adequately respond to Katrina’s victims.

The District of Columbia was among the first local jurisdictions to reach out to Katrina victims, and 300 were cared for here and given the full bevy of services. Like the District, many of the states and local governments have laid out millions of dollars upfront without payment as yet from FEMA.

However, my concern is for the more than 75,000 people still in shelters and thousands of others away from family and friends. Is today’s FEMA capable of assisting these victims of disaster through the direct provision of housing or through temporary housing solutions? Is FEMA capable of addressing the needs of over 300,000 people who have requested rental housing assistance? Is FEMA prepared for the “long haul” that Katrina recovery necessitates?

This much is clear. FEMA has suffered rather than benefited from its absorption into DHS. Although the exact numbers are disputed, the agency’s core budget for disaster preparedness has been cut every year since it went into DHS. Its staff has been reduced by 500 positions. Hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and other natural disasters come on cue every year yet three of every four local preparedness and first responder grants have gone for terrorism-related activities. The GAO reports that 75% of next year’s grants are similarly targeted to terrorism despite many local official complaints that the most urgent need is for natural disasters and accidents. Some considerable direction of funding to terrorist prevention was fully justified after 9/11, but we now know that billions of dollars were not distributed on a risk basis. The recent House Homeland Security reauthorization requires risk-based funding and strategies but awaits Senate action. We also know, not only from Katrina but also from the way FEMA was overwhelmed by four hurricanes in Florida in 2004, that “all hazards” has become a bureaucratic slogan. And we have known from that FEMA was in complete disarray at least since the Florida experience last year.

FEMA has apparently regressed to the hapless and inefficient agency it was before James Lee Witt, the first career disaster specialist to head FEMA in 1993, reorganized and energized the agency and was praised for FEMA’s recovery response to the earthquake in Northridge, California and to the Mississippi River flooding. This subcommittee cannot alone return FEMA to those halcyon days of praise and worthiness, but with the series of oversight hearings you begin today, Mr. Chairman, we can pledge the oversight the agency will need to assure the improvement that the public expects after the lessons taught by Katrina.